United Nations S/2015/55

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 January 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 24 January 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in connection with the shelling of Mariupol, Donetsk region, by terrorists (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Sergeyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-01148 (E) 030215

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Annex to the letter dated 24 January 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the terrorist attack on Mariupol

On 24 January, Russian-backed terrorists committed another heinous crime against humanity. As a result of the shelling of residential areas in Mariupol, in eastern Ukraine, more than 20 civilians have been killed and more than 80 wounded. According to preliminary information, the bombardment was carried out using multiple "Grad" rocket launchers from inside terrorist-controlled territory.

Ukraine mourns the completely innocent civilian victims and expresses the whole country's sincere condolences to their families and relatives. We wish the injured a speedy recovery.

This crime will be thoroughly and objectively investigated. Those guilty will be brought to justice. We call upon the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to urgently join such an investigation.

The shelling took place after statements by one of the terrorist leaders about imminent attacks on Ukrainian cities, as well as a significant intensification of inflows of Russian armed forces and weapons into the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Russia, which continues to materially support terrorist activities and whose troops are directly involved in hostilities against Ukraine, is solely responsible for the murders of innocent civilians in Volnovakha, Debaltseve, Donetsk, Mariupol and many other towns and villages in Ukraine in recent weeks.

We seek international support so that Russia will finally be compelled to keep its promises, rein in its proxies and stop sending troops and weaponry into Ukraine. We demand that Russia fully implement the Minsk agreements, which it has thus far supported only in words, including the immediate withdrawal of all its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine, the stabilization of the Ukrainian-Russian border and the establishment of international monitoring.

We call upon the international community to condemn this and other crimes committed by terrorists. Today, as ever, we need joint decisive action from the international community against terrorist organizations and those who control them.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
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Letter dated 26 January 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the sixteenth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter covers the period from 23 December 2014 to 22 January 2015.

I am pleased to note that the destruction of the remaining 12 chemical weapons production facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic is now under way, beginning with the first and second tunnels. I hope that the delays in the start of these activities can be overcome and that the anticipated completion date of 30 June 2015 can be met.

With regard to the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration and subsequent amendments, OPCW technical experts continue their dialogue with the Syrian authorities. Cooperation between the Syrian authorities and OPCW remains critical for the resolution of any outstanding issues in this regard.

The third report of the OPCW fact-finding mission that is looking into allegations of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was released on 18 December 2014. That third report, together with the previous two reports of the fact-finding mission, was subsequently circulated to the members of the Security Council through a request to the President of the Security Council on behalf of eight Council members. The work of the fact-finding mission is ongoing. I take this opportunity to reiterate my deep concern at the findings contained in all three reports and my unequivocal condemnation of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons, by any party to the conflict.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Council. My report covers the period from 23 December 2014 to 22 January 2015 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

Note by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision.

In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the sixteenth such monthly report.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2 (f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 December 2014 to 22 January 2015.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

4. In accordance with subparagraph 1 (c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. As reported previously, all declared chemicals have been removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, while all declared stocks of the Category 1 chemical have been destroyed. Progress achieved within the current reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling other obligations is described below:

(a) Progress continues to be made with respect to the destruction and verification of the 12 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) (seven aircraft hangars and five underground structures) in the Syrian Arab Republic as per Council decision EC-M-43/DEC.1 (dated 24 July 2014). Destruction operations started on 24 December 2014 and are currently ongoing at two of the five underground structures; all auxiliary buildings have been destroyed at both sites, and the construction of the interior plug and the filling of the tunnel with gravel and sand have been completed at the first site. With regard to the planned time frame for completion of operations, it is expected that the first CWPF will be destroyed no later than the end of January 2015. Preparatory work is expected to start soon at one of the seven aircraft hangars, depending on security and weather conditions. Due to challenges in the procurement of specialized drilling equipment and explosives, as

well as other technical problems, the destruction of 12 CWPFs may encounter some delays.

(b) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs. The fourteenth such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 16 January 2015 (EC-78/P/NAT.2, dated 16 January 2015).

(c) In accordance with subparagraph 1 (e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation during the reporting period.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

5. Following the complete removal of identified chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic on 23 June 2014, destruction activities are nearing completion. The following subparagraphs provide information on the destruction of the remaining Syrian chemical weapons at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, and at facilities sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2 (dated 17 December 2013):

(a) As at the cut-off date of this report, Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC in the United States of America had destroyed 65% of the received chemicals. The destruction of the chemical received at Mexichem UK Limited began in December 2014. As at the cut-off date of this report, a total of 9.1% of the received chemical had already been destroyed. Destruction of the remaining chemical at these two facilities is currently on hold, as technical issues are sorted out.

(b) As at the cut-off date of this report, 45.2% of the DF effluent and 57% of the HD effluent, which were produced by the neutralization process on board the MV Cape Ray, had already been destroyed by Ekokem in Finland and at the GEKA facility in Germany, respectively.

6. Taken together, the destruction activities described in subparagraphs 5 (a) to 5 (d) above mean that, as at the cut-off date of this report, 100% of the Category 1 chemicals and 89.1% of the Category 2 chemicals had been destroyed, representing a combined total of 97.8%, including the isopropanol previously destroyed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will continue to provide such information during briefings to States Parties in The Hague and through the monthly reports. Timelines for the completion of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons were provided in the overall report on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme (paragraph 25 of EC-76/DG.16, dated 4 July 2014), which was noted by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session. While the Secretariat is not able to give a forecast at this stage about the completion of destruction of remaining chemical in the United Kingdom and United States, estimates for Germany and Finland are the end of March and June respectively.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

7. Cooperation with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has continued in the context of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. In mid-January, the OPCW, UNOPS, and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic signed an amendment to the tripartite agreement between them, with the purpose of updating the scope of requirements attached to the agreement and including new timelines for the commencement of destruction activities at the 12 CWPFs in December 2014 and for the completion of destruction of the first CWPF by 31 January 2015. In the meantime, the parties have also finalized negotiations for a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the provision of medical services and emergency medical evacuation services to the UNOPS and OPCW personnel present in the Syrian Arab Republic, with a view to an early signing of this MoU.

8. As at the cut-off date of this report, four OPCW staff members were deployed as part of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. From 16 to 18 January, three additional OPCW staff members were present in Damascus for liaison with UNOPS, the Syrian authorities, and Syrian companies, with a view to handling the outstanding issues related to the destruction of Syrian CWPFs, and visited two sites. A meeting of the Steering Committee also took place at that time. Ambassador José Artur Denot Medeiros of Brazil, in his capacity as Special Adviser to the Director-General on Syria, is expected to visit Damascus before the end of January.

9. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties hosting a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. He also communicated regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat has continued to provide regular information briefings to States Parties in The Hague on behalf of the Director-General.

10. As stipulated by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session (paragraph 6.17 of EC-76/6, dated 11 July 2014), the Secretariat and the Syrian authorities continue to cooperate on outstanding issues regarding the Syrian declaration. At the Forty-Eighth Meeting of the Council, the Secretariat issued the "Second Status Report on the Activities of the Declaration Assessment Team" (DAT) (EC-M-48/P/S/1, dated 14 January 2015), which was noted by the Council, and gave a follow-up presentation for States Parties on the activities of the DAT. The team will visit the Syrian Arab Republic for the seventh time before the end of January and will hold further consultations with the Syrian authorities, with a view to updating the Syrian declaration.

11. As reported previously, the implementation of additional special monitoring measures, as specified in Note EC-M-43/DG.1/Rev.1 (dated 21 July 2014), will include the use of a vault monitoring system, which is based on technology already in use by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As previously reported, in cooperation with Aquila Technologies, the OPCW has finalized the administrative requirements for the first phase of implementing the monitoring system in the underground structures, and is currently finalizing the requirements for the second implementation phase. Implementation of the monitoring system is consistent with the agreed time frame for the planned construction activities related to the interior plugs. Fibre-optic cables have been already installed and successfully tested in two internal plugs at two underground structures. Aquila Technologies will organize the

training of operators of the system in The Hague, as defined for the second phase, in April and May 2015. The construction of the base stations, which will accommodate the transmission equipment in each underground structure, has already been agreed with the Syrian contractor and UNOPS, and construction activities have started at the first site.

Supplementary resources

12. As at the cut-off date of this report, the total contribution received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 50.3 million. Contributions have been received from Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.

13. The Secretariat has approached the Syrian Government with a request for reimbursement of costs relating to verification activities for the period from September 2013 to August 2014 amounting to EUR 2.3 million. The request was made in keeping with States Parties' obligations under Articles IV and V of the Convention. The Syrian authorities have indicated that they remain unable to cover these costs on the basis of the reasons stipulated at the time that the Syrian Arab Republic joined the Convention.

Conclusion

14. The main focus of future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will continue to be on the destruction of the 12 remaining CWPFs, which started on 24 December 2014. The Declaration Assessment Team will also continue its work in the Syrian Arab Republic.

15. The Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) that is looking into allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic is continuing its work. As reported previously, the FFM has submitted its third report (S/1230/2014, dated 18 December 2014), with a detailed account of the work that underpins the key findings presented in its second report. The Mission concluded with a high degree of confidence that chlorine has been used as a weapon in three villages in northern Syria.

16. On 19 December 2014, the Secretariat received from the Syrian Arab Republic a classified document with information relating to a number of alleged uses of chlorine as a weapon. The Director-General has written to the Syrian authorities proposing that there should be further enquiries to establish facts relating to these allegations, underscoring at the same time the importance of the safety and security of the team in the conduct of its work. With the agreement of the Syrian Arab Republic, the document was made available to States Parties in unclassified format on 20 January 2015.